NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

11/hs
Ser 325
25 March 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVAVNSAFECEN as UNDETERMINED with MATERIAL FAILURE (undetermined component of engine) and PILOT (emergency or unusual situation developed which placed pilot beyond limits of his experience level) as probable contributing factors.

W. CARMAN
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 404) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

Code 62/Pn
20 June 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 54-67

Ref: (a) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 282356Z April 1967
(b) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 191918Z April 1967
(c) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 270102Z April 1967
(d) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 220118Z April 1967
(e) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Norfolk 042204Z May 1967

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. A-3B, BUNO 138917, assigned to HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE (VAH-123) and piloted by LCDR Richard Earl PARKS, USN, (b) (6) (b) crashed (ALFA) on a snow covered mountain at the 7000-foot level, at 1432(U), 5 April 1967, eight miles southeast of Alturas, California. The four occupants of the aircraft sustained fatal injuries in the crash. The crash site was in a U. S. Forest Preserve, and property damage was limited to broken trees.

b. Synopsis of Flight. The aircraft was enroute from NAS Miramar to NAS Whidbey Island on an instrument flight plan at Flight Level (FL) 180. Flight Level 220 had been requested, but was not available. The weather in the area was cumulus buildups with tops at FL 200. The assigned altitude, therefore, placed the aircraft in the clouds for at least some of the time. Moderate to occasionally severe turbulence was reported in the buildups. The aircraft was directed to change frequencies for hand-off from Oakland Center to Seattle Center, but no contact was made with Seattle Center. Radar contact was lost in the vicinity of Alturas, California, and search was initiated. The crash site was located by Forest Rangers.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) Pilot. LCDR PARKS had 2821 total flight hours. He was a student replacement pilot in VAH-123 and had 25 hours in the A-3. The flight had been scheduled as an instrument check as a part of the syllabus training. He had 3.6 hours of instrument flight in the A-3 prior to departure from NAS

Whidbey Island the previous day. His previous experience was primarily in A-1H aircraft. His jet experience consisted of 72 hours. He held a special instrument rating and was considered well qualified for this flight.

(2) Instructor Pilot. LCDR Donald Edwin KING, USN, (b) (6) had 4209 total flight hours of which 1786 hours were in jet aircraft and 833 hours in the A-3.

(3) Plane Captain. Carl Virgil MILLER, ADJ3, USN, (b) (6) was a well qualified crewman with about 1100 hours in the A-3. He was probably in the fourth seat as it is the procedure for the plane captain to secure the hatch prior to taxiing.

(4) Passenger. LCDR James Merritt READER, USN, (b) (6) was a passenger enroute to NAS Whidbey Island for duty. His log books were aboard the aircraft and were not recovered. He was probably in the third crew position.

(5) Aircraft. BUNO 138917 was accepted on 28 December 1956 and had accumulated 3749 total hours. The sixth PAR was completed in October 1966 and 440 hours were subsequently flown. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and 246 hours were since flown.

(6) Engines

(a) J57-P-10, serial number P607625, had accumulated 2435 hours since acceptance. The fourth overhaul was completed on 9 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in February 1964 and verified during the last overhaul. This engine was installed on the port side.

(b) J57-P-10, serial number 632289, had accumulated 2076 hours since acceptance. The third overhaul was completed on 11 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in September 1965 and verified during the last overhaul. The engine was installed on the starboard side.

(7) Weather. The nearest weather reporting station was Klamath Falls, Oregon. At 1400 (U) the reported weather was 3000-foot ceiling with

light snow showers, temperature 40 degrees F, dewpoint 25 degrees F, with lowering ceilings. Cumulus buildups were to FL 200. The aeronautical weather at Alturas, California, nearby the crash site is unknown; however, persons on the ground recall the clouds to be well below the mountain peaks with occasional snow.

b. Field Investigation. The field investigation was hampered by a four-foot accumulation of snow. The location of parts was not practicable beyond the immediate impact area. The physical removal of heavy components required prodigious effort; and, upon removal of the engines, further salvage operations were postponed until the snow melted. Certain smaller engine accessories and airframe components were located and carried out by hand. Parts removed from the mountain were flown to the designated overhaul points for failure analysis.

c. Failure Analysis

(1) The airframe components were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda and the report of the analysis is reference (b) and amplified by reference (c). Pertinent findings of these analyses are:

(a) Both air turbine motors (ATM) were turning at impact.

(b) Aileron boost and surface control hydraulic pump, P/N AA 65319R6, showed no evidence of seizure.

(c) The remote attitude indicator (VGI) had the sphere distorted such that it appeared the impact attitude of the aircraft was vertical and tail down. While no correlation is suggested, it should be noted that a typical unit with power removed would assume the orientation observed in the damaged unit.

(d) One DC generator had indications of stationary axial impact. No evidence of rotation at impact was found on the armature.

(e) Wing fuel boost pump was running at impact.

(f) The emergency escape chute had not been fired. One recovered cartridge was tested and it fired within voltage and current limits.

(2) The engines and accessories were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC North Island, and the report of the priority disassembly inspection (PDIR)

is reference (d). The port engine was concluded to be stopped or at low RPM at impact. The starboard engine was rotating at impact. No indication of malfunction was found in the engine accessories. The engines were incomplete as recovered. The first, second, third, fifteenth stages of the port engine compressor were missing; with the fourth and sixteenth stages unattached. The first five spacers from the N1 compressor were missing. The first and second stages of the starboard engine were missing; with the third, fourth, and sixteenth stages unattached. The first, second, and fourth spacers from the N1 compressor were missing.

d. Other Investigation and Analysis

(1) NORAD radar was tracking BUNO 138917 along his route of flight. The computer readout indicated a ground speed of 443 knots and a steady track of 340°, along J-5 airway. At 1431.9(U) the readout suddenly changed to 396 knots and 327° track. Very shortly thereafter the radar return disappeared. The geographic plot of the point of lost radar contact by NORAD was 5 to 7 miles further along the track than the Seattle Center radar (located at Klamath Falls). The variation could be an indication of an electrical power loss causing the IFF to become inoperative and cause the center radar contact loss prior to the loss of the radar return by the NORAD radar. The speed loss and the course deviation were duplicated by a pilot of VAH-123 by an intentional sudden power reduction on one engine. The maneuver also resulted in a severe yaw which caused considerable control problems from which the pilot was able to recover under the existing VFR conditions.

(2) The combination of left course deviation observed by NORAD radar and the stopped or low RPM condition of the port engine led to concern about the possibility of failure or seizure of the port engine. During the course of the investigation, another mishap occurred in a VAH-10 aircraft, in the Caribbean area, which was operationally similar to the hypothesis formulated in this accident. This second mishap did not result in a crash. Two crewmen had bailed out while the aircraft was out of control. Upon reaching a low altitude the pilot successfully regained control and landed the aircraft. The starboard engine was found to have suffered severe damage in the compressor area and had extensive damage to the engine pod nose cowl. A PDIR was performed at NAVAIRREWORKFAC, Norfolk. Reference (e) is the report of this investigation and cites the cause of the engine failure to have been the use of the old type second stage compressor rotor two-rail spacer, P/N 206973, rather than the currently required three-rail spacer, P/N 366490. The engine log book indicated that J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 (new spacer) had been incorporated. As noted in 2c(2) above, this spacer has not been recovered from the crash site.

3. CONCLUSIONS

a. The cause of this accident is undetermined.

b. The possible cause is a loss of flight control due to severe yaw brought about by a failure of the port engine. An electrical power failure and temporary loss of hydraulic systems may have resulted from a pilot reaction to reduce power on the remaining starboard engine, causing the ATM's to fall below operating RPM. Such conditions in an instrument flight situation would render the aircraft uncontrollable due to the tumbled VGI, asymmetrical thrust, and limited hydraulic flight control. If, as in the VAH-10 mishap, the engine failure also caused compressor case and nose cowl damage, an undetermined but severe amount of asymmetrical drag would be experienced causing further control difficulty.

4. RECOMMENDATION. None, pending further salvage efforts which are planned when snow conditions permit.

Distribution:
List A
CNO (Op-05F)

DEPARTMEN[illegible] COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON
OPTIONAL REVIEW

NOTE:
1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT:

The BOARDS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAGER FACTUAL INFORMATION AND MUCH CONJECTURE. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WILL REMAIN UNDETERMINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY BE GLEANED FROM FURTHER INVESTIGATION, AS ADDITIONAL COMPONENTS MAY BE RECOVERED

LAS 221C 221
INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:

The NAVAIRSyscom is having a study conducted to determine the feaseability of installing the YANKEE extraction System in the A3 type aircraft.

N.W.P. 433

Concur with conclusions & recommendations of AMR & endorsers. AS 1/42.

INITIAL/CODE

AIR-4041:WHH

25 JAN 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.

2. The A-3 YANKEE Extraction tests have been basically completed by the contractor. It has been determined that the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft is technically feasible. Final determination on the requirement, priority and funding for the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations.

A. T. PIMENTEL, JR.
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMREADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
CO HATRON 123

1. INTERNAL ACTIVITY: NARF-316-SW NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300)	2. REPORT NO. 927	3. DATE OF D/I 16 Nov 67	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE AND PART NO. P/N 5380824-549 Horizontal stabilizer actuator	ENGINE	
5. ASSEMBLY (Model)	6. ASSEMBLY (Serial)	7. ASSEMBLY MFR 88277	8. DATE REMOVED	9. REMOVED FROM (Eng Mod)	10. REMOVED FROM (Eng Ser)
11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW Unknown	12. HRS SINCE LAST O/H Unknown	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO. PREV O/H'S	16. AIRCRAFT (Model) A-3B
17. AIRCRAFT (BUNO) 138917					
18. OPERATING ACTIVITY VAH-123	19. FOR (EFR, AAR, I/F/H/GA	20. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE Accident/incident damage LB			

21. FINDINGS: [ ] O NO DISCREPANCY; [X] B BASIC (MFG/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY; [ ] N NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY; [ ] F FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.) | COND | ZONE

23. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.) | COND

24. PERTINENT BULLETINS, CHANGES, ETC INCORPORATED: NUMBER | YES | NO

25. [X] PRIORITY DIR; REQUESTED BY: NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC msg 310110Z Oct 67.; REFERENCE: Control No. 3282-67.; GMED 114: APPLICABLE / INCORPORATED

26. SIGNATURE: (b) (6) redacted

31. TITLE: WEAPONS SYSTEMS ENGR DIV HEAD

32. DATE: 30 November 1967

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT / NAVWEPS FORM 6730/2 (11-61) — REPORT SYMBOL DUWEPS 6730-2

20. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include nomenclature and part no. of primary part failure)

Ref: (a) VAH-123 msg 252314Z Oct 1967
(b) NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA DIR 854 of 18 Jul 1967

a. A remaining part of the horizontal stabilizer actuator was recovered as reported by reference (a). This part was received for DIR as a continuation of reference (b), which reported the actuator was jammed by crash impact in approximately the neutral position.

b. Only the lower mounting portion comprising the housing assembly P/N 5380909-501 was received. The transmitter, AC motor assembly P/N XA30525 and DC motor assembly P/N D949 were torn away by crash impact and missing.

c. Disassembly disclosed no discrepancies other than those caused by crash impact.

PRIORITY

27. CONCLUSIONS: There is no evidence to indicate this portion of the actuator was not operating satisfactorily prior to crash impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

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COMNAVAIRPAC
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NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
VAH-123
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
NAVAIREWORKFAC QUONPT
NAVAIREWORKFAC JAX

704051

3750
Ser 80/ 3397

8 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6E

1. Readdressed and forwarded for NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ comments concerning the recommendation contained in Part X concerning installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft.

2. The conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, are concurred with.

3. The first endorsement does not show complete copy to distribution. By copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer, VAH-123 is requested to ensure complete copy to distribution in accordance with subparagraph 4h of reference (a).

V. R. HUBLER
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMREADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
CO HATRON 123

Code 015-ee
3750
Ser: 678

2 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR Ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A-3B BUNO 138917, Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the comments and recommendations of the Board as modified by the first two endorsements, except as noted below.

2. Insufficient evidence exists to include pilot deviation from NATOPS procedures as a contributing cause factor. The starboard engine was operating near the idle range; however, the reason for this is a matter of conjecture.

3. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the need of an extraction system for A-3 crew members. The number of possible saves for Whidbey based aircraft are correctly stated in the second endorsement. These do not include combat losses.

4. Plans for further investigation at the crash site are being made. It is estimated that the snow will have receded enough by 1 July to permit access to the area.

J. A. JAAP

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREP LBEACH
HATRON ONE TWO THREE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMCVW-12:bd
3750
Ser 80/330
23 MAY 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A3B BUNO 138917
Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board as modified by the remarks of the first endorser and with the following comments:

a. Exception is taken to the unsubstantiated remarks made by the medical officer in paragraph VII A.3. in the conclusions of his report. A review of the accident statistics for A3 aircraft reveals this is the third accident in 40 months in which an ejection system could have conceivably prevented fatal injuries. In one of these cases an ejection system with at least a "zero - zero", capability would have been required. This is not to say that an ejection system for A3 aircraft is not an urgent requirement. This endorser certainly recognizes the need for an escape system for crew members of all high speed/high performance aircraft. However, it is the opinion of this endorser that conclusions, and recommendations must be made from, a basis of fact, and not from an emotional viewpoint.

2. It is noted that the instructor pilot for this flight had last completed the NATOPS Standardization Check on 8/14/64. Subsequent investigation reveals a sagging emphasis on this point in that two instructor pilots of VAH-123 are overdue for NATOPS qualification checks. It is further noted that a program, whereby each instructor is checked for NATOPS standardization in conjunction with his annual examination for proficency in instrument flying, has been initiated. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE is directed to insure the standardization of each instructor, in accordance with current directives at the earliest possible date.

3. It is further noted that section A.19. of the Aircraft Accident Report Form 3750-1 should be changed to reflect altitude 7200 feet above mean sea level and zero feet above terrain.

R. E. Gallatin

R. E. GALLATIN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Copy to:
CO, VAH-123
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

VAH-123/JPS:dwc
3750
Ser 00/ 868
12 MAY 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967 A3B BUNO 138917 Pilot PARKS

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron One Two Three
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing Twelve
(2) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board with the following exceptions:

a. Concur. Although it cannot be determined why the crew made no effort to abandon the aircraft, it must be re-emphasized that bailout is the proper course of action when faced with an emergency at altitudes less than 10,000 feet above the terrain. This is the NATOPS procedure and is taught to all A-3 flight crews. It will be continually re-emphasized at all crew meetings.

b. Do not concur. Flight crews must always be aware of the type of terrain below their aircraft. This information is available on other charts and its inclusion on the enroute FLIP charts would detract from what now is a highly useable inflight chart.

c. Do not concur. No apparent attempt was made to abandon the aircraft using the installed emergency exit and it is not known if the YANKEE extraction system would have been used if installed in the aircraft. The age of the aircraft and its expected utilization during its remaining service life does not warrant the expenditure of large sums for the installation of new equipment.

d. Concur.

e. Concur. All possible efforts will be made to recover further wreckage and ascertain additional facts concerning the accident. Any new developments will be forwarded when available.

2. The boards conclusions and recommendations are based on a meager amount of factual evidence and much conjecture. The possibilities are almost limitless and the actual factors may never be determined. The port engine failure by itself would not cause the accident, but the action taken by the pilot or the instructor could have aggravated the emergency.

3. An examination of LCDR PARKS flight log shows that he had not been involved in a previous pilot caused accident.

4. The last COMNAVAIRPAC Accident Prevention Survey was completed on 30 March 1967

J. P. SUNDBERG

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E










ENCL 01

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-[illegible]) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Part 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION [illegible].6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY *	2. SERIAL NO. *	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP *	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT *	5. BUREAU NUMBER *
CO, HATRON-123	1-67A	051431U APR	A-3B	138917

6. * TO Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP *	10. DAMAGE *
7. VIA *	8. *	11. TIME OF DAY * / 12. TIME IN FLIGHT * / 13. FLIGHT CODE *
		14. CLEARED FROM * TO
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE * / 16. AIRSPEED / 17. A/C WEIGHT
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP *		19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP S.L. TERRAIN
20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (*Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C*) *		

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1 PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9 SERVICING PERSONNEL		17 WEATHER
	2 PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10 LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18 DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3 PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11 OTHER PERSONNEL (*Specify*)		19 DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4 PILOT OTHER (*Specify*)		12 ADMINISTRATIVE		20 DESIGN OTHER (*Specify*)
	5 CREW		13 FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21 ROLLING/PITCHING DECK, ROUGH SEAS
	6 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14 FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22 MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15 FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (*Ship or field*)		23 UNDETERMINED
	8 SUPERVISORY OTHER (*Specify*)		16 FACILITIES OTHER (*Specify*)		24 OTHER (*Specify*)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) *	2. GRADE/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIG. NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP.	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)									
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1) KING, Donald E.	LCDR	(b) (6) [redacted]		USN	36	14 YRS	INST PILOT	B/N	[illegible]

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM	TOTAL	
11 ALL MODELS		4209	17 CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	180 /
				IN MODEL	UNK / UNK
12 ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		413	18 FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	74 / 112
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13 ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		92	19 INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	8 / 10
				IN MODEL	4 / 5
14 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	833	20 NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	5 /
	OFT/CPT	UNK / UNK		IN MODEL	5 /
15 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	182	21 TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap)		1786
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0			
16 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	43	22 LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	4 April 1967
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0		DURATION	3
23 DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		8/14/64 QUAL	24 TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) *	26. GRADE	27. RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION

OP-OS7

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with — OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2 — *Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

PART II MAINTENANCE MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
28 Dec 56	3748.9	6	6	439.7	NAS ALAMEDA	CAL. ODD	246.3	79

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)	J-57 P-10	P607 625	2434.7	4	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(2)	J-57 P-10	P632 289	2076.1	3	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)	ATM 78P-247	352040-0-4	1746.2	2	543.6	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(2)	ATM PX-44-175	352030-0-2	1883.9	5	453.7	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
	18,000'	360K EST	UNK	UNK	LEVEL FLT	UNK	LEVEL

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
UNK	☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED				☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS
UNK	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPPUR SERIAL NUMBER
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP VAH-123 110345Z — *Refer to A/C or DIR request. See para. 86 OPNAVINST 3750.6A*
3. OTHER
4.

OP-3750

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: CATAPULT / ARRESTING GEAR	PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER	
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR USED				

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12 DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14 CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15 ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

See weather enclosure.

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
			Time extension granted by CNAP 202226Z APR 67	2CC NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT (AAR) 1CC BUWEPS DIRECT (AAR) 1CC COMNAVAIRPAC 1CC COMFAIRWHIDBEY 1CC COMRCVW-12 1CC PLANT REPO LONG BEACH

COST DAMAGE TO	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	Various trees of unknown value	NONE	5 MAY 1967

SIGNATURES OF BOARD

[redacted]	OPERATIONS OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)	[redacted]	AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)
[redacted]	FLIGHT SURGEON	[redacted] USN	MATERIAL OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OP-OSF

V THE ACCIDENT

On 5 April A3B BUNO 138917, NJ309, departed NAS Miramar at 1316 local for NAS Whidbey Island via Bakersfield, J-5 Seattle direct NAS Whidbey at flight level 220, airspeed 450 knots TAS. The flight progressed normally, deviating from filed flight level to 180. At 1428 approximately 95 nautical miles SSE of Lakeview VORTAC Oakland Center advised 138917 to contact Seattle Center on frequency 306.3 MCS. This transmission was acknowledged with no statement of difficulty. At 1430 the aircraft reported at flight level 180 to Seattle Center but did not acknowledge when subsequently requested to SQUAWK IDENT. At 1431 Seattle Center observed the aircraft make an abrupt left deviation from flight track and disappear from radar at 41 - 27N, 120 - 15W.

Agencies concerned were alerted at this time and at 1630 search and rescue attempts were initiated by Air Rescue Center at Hamilton AFB. At approximately 1430 a witness 8½ miles from the scene heard an explosion and observed smoke. He subsequently notified the MODOC county sheriff in Alturas, California. Search and rescue aircraft maintained a vigil over the scene throughout the remainder of the day and all during the night. Search efforts were hampered by dense cloud cover and restricted visibility in snow showers. The following morning, 6 April 1967, the MODOC county sheriff in a light civil aircraft visually spotted the wreckage at 41° - 17'N, 120° - 16'W. The wreckage was located on the western side of the Warner Mountain range at 7400' level amidst a forested area with snow depths approximately 4 - 6 feet (see enclosure 2). Coincidentally, a ground party of two U. S. Forest Rangers assigned to the Modoc National Forest reached the scene via snow tractor and established that there were no survivors at the wreckage site. A navy flight surgeon, dropped by helo later during the day, verified that there were no survivors at the crash scene. On 8 April the navy aircraft accident investigative team from VAH-123 established that all four occupants had remained with the aircraft and further search efforts terminated. Rescue report, OPNAV form 3750-13 is contained as enclosure (3).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E


GB1
GB2
GB3
GB
GA
Alturas
GA1
GA2
GA3
GA4
GA5
LAKEVIEW
332°/72 NM
SQUAW PEAK
SURPRISE VALLEY
WARNER MOUNTAINS
2231.9|329|396
2251.5|339|449
2231.2|340|443
2230.7|342|446
2230.4|345|454
MODOC NATIONAL FOREST
MODOC COUNTY
LASSEN COUNTY
2230.1|349|459
2229.7|350|460
2229.4|352|462
2229.0|352|462
2228.7|351|464
EAGLE PEAK
9883
COLE PEAK
LAWERSON PEAK
HAT MOUNTAIN
REDROCK MOUNTAIN
BIG ROCK VALLEY
TIME/HDG/AIRSPEED
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B
Enclosure (2)


205°M
GROUND IMPACT
Enclosure (4)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B


PROJECTED FLIGHT PATH TO IMPACT POINT
FLIGHT PATH



9-2 FLIGHT PATH

AIRCRAFT ENTRY ANGLE INTO IMPACT AREA



9 c WRECKAGE SITE



ENGINE PHOTOGRAPHS

VAH-123 SERIAL 1-67A 5 APRIL 1967 A-3B BUNO 133917 PILOT PARKS

ENCLOSURE (10) VIEWS SHOWING DAMAGE TO BOTH ENGINES
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6E





TURN + BANK

11-1 COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS


ATM-50-7 MARK INDICATING ROTATION


ATM
50-10
ROTAT
11-2 #2 ATM SCROLL

BURNED FIBERGLASS MATERIAL SHOWING NUMEROUS INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE INFLIGHT BURNING